Separation of Powers and Executive Overreach Case Studies from Post-1978 Sri Lanka

Abstract

Since the adoption of the 1978 Constitution, Sri Lanka’s constitutional order has been defined by a strong executive presidency coexisting with a sovereign legislature and a judiciary tasked with protecting the rule of law. While constitutional text recognizes the separation of powers, successive governments have frequently relied on emergency rule, constitutional amendment, executive discretion over parliamentary processes, and appointment powers to expand presidential authority. This article examines how executive overreach has tested Sri Lanka’s constitutional equilibrium through five emblematic post-1978 case studies: (i) emergency regulations during the 1983–1993 period; (ii) constitutional amendments affecting independent checks from 2001–2020; (iii) the 2018 constitutional crisis surrounding the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the floor test; (iv) the use of regulatory powers during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (v) executive assertions during the 2022 economic crisis. Across these episodes, the analysis highlights recurring weaknesses: the breadth of discretion in emergency and regulatory frameworks, the vulnerability of independent commissions to constitutional reversal, and Parliament’s fluctuating capacity to perform oversight under party majorities and dissolution threats. The article also maps the judiciary’s evolving posture from early deference toward more assertive interventions, particularly in 2018, and evaluates the role of civil society and media as extra-institutional checks. It concludes with targeted reform proposals to entrench appointments independence, tighten emergency safeguards, clarify prime ministerial tenure mechanics, and strengthen parliamentary scrutiny so that crisis governance does not become a routine route to executive consolidation.